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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Amended Notice of Default materially altered the terms
and the

legal effect

of the original Notice of Default and

thereby vitiated the Notice of Default.
Default

gave the defendants

and third

The Amended Notice of
parties actual

and/or

constructive notice that the defendants had three months from the
date

of the

recording

of the Amended

Notice

of Default to

reinstate the loan and that the time frame for the foreclosure
was commenced

from the date of the recording of the Amended

Notice of Default.

Additionally, the Amended Notice of Default

included a parcel of three, four-plexes which was omitted from
the original
property

Notice

encumbered

of Default although
by

the

subject

it was part of the

Trust

Deed.

This was a

material change to the Notice of Default as plaintiff was not
required to foreclose on all of its secured property.
Accordingly, the court erred in finding that the Notice of
Default and the December 1985 trustee's sale arising therefrom
was a valid sale, as the Notice of Default had been vitiated.
The Amended Notice of Default and subsequent April 1986 Trustee's
Sale was

the valid

sale,

and

a judgment

should

be entered

accordingly.
ARGUMENT
THE APRIL 1986 TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS THE VALID TRUSTEE'S SALE
AS THE AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT MATERIALLY ALTERED THE
ORIGINAL NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND THEREBY VITIATED THE NOTICE
OF DEFAULT AND INVALIDATED THE DECEMBER 1985 TRUSTEE'S SALE.
The legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default cannot be
1

ignored by the defendants nor by the Court.

The

Amended

Notice

of Default must be considered as an alteration of the original
Notice of Default.

The general rule regarding alteration of

documents is stated as follows:
An alteration of an instrument, in order to have a
vitiating effect, must be material;
or, stated
conversely, that an immaterial alteration of an
instrument does not affect its validity.. . . Generally
speaking, any alteration of an instrument is material
which destroys the identity of the instrument...or
which so changes its terms as to give it a different
legal effect from that which it originally had, and
thus works some change in the rights, obligations,
interest or relations of the parties... .
4 Am Jur 2d Alteration of Instruments § 4 and 5 (1962).
The legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default on the
original Notice of Default was twofold and, in fact, changed the
rights and obligations of the parties.

First, a new three month

cure period began from the date of the filing for record the
Amended Notice of Default, pursuant to the terms of Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-24 and 31 (1953 as amended) and the terms of the
Amended Notice of Default itself which specifically provided for
an extension of 90 days after the recording of the Amended Notice
of Default for the defendants or other interested parties to
reinstate the loan and cure the default.
The second legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default was
that

its legal description

included

an additional

property which consisted of three, four-plexes.

parcel of

This property

was not included in the original Notice of Default, but was part
of plaintiff's security under the subject Trust Deed.

This

property

that

was

divisible

and

separate
2

from

the property

consisted of the original Notice of Default.

The property was

not required to be included in the foreclosure.

For this reason,

the Trustee amended the Notice of Default so as to properly
include the three, four-plexes as part of the foreclosure.

Had

the Notice of Default not been amended, it is hardly conceivable
that the defendants and the lower Court would have allowed the
plaintiff to foreclose and sell the three, four-plexes.
Furthermore, the recordation
Notice

of

Default

not

only

and mailing of the Amended

provided

actual

notice

to

the

defendants and other interested parties, but pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1988),

provided constructive notice to "the

world"

month

that

a

new

three

cure period

and

foreclosure

proceeding had commenced.
The lower Court, in a somewhat confusing manner regarding
the Amended Notice of Default, stated that the

"...amendment was

a material defect in that notice which in a legal sense vitiated
the

effectiveness

of the notice of default

inasmuch as the

defendants1 time to cure was not adversely affected in any way
shape or form."

(See Court Transcript, p. 9, lines 1-6). The

lower Court stated that the Amended Notice of Default created a
material change to the Notice of Default and thereby vitiated the
Notice of Default. (See Court Transcript, p. 8, lines 21-25).
Nevertheless, contrary to its findings, the lower Court held that
the Notice of Default and thereby the December 1985 Trustee's
Sale were valid.

The lower Court also stated that the cure

period was not shortened by the Amended Notice of Default.
3

(See

Court Transcript, p. 8, lines 24-25).

Ironically, however, by

ignoring the Amended Notice of Default the lower Court in fact
did shorten the cure period allowed to defendants and other
parties by almost one and one-half months.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, neither the parties nor the Court
may disregard the legal effect of the Amended Notice of Default
which granted additional rights to the parties and materially
altered and vitiated the original Notice of Default.
Accordingly, the Court must find that the lower court erred
in finding that the December 1985 Trustee's Sale was valid.
Amended

Notice

of

Default

with

the

subsequent

April

The
1986

Trustee's Sale, was the valid sale for the property and the Court
should enter judgment accordingly.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 1989.
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN,
KESLER & SWINTON

<r -4k^l/^^^^
Glen W. Roberts
Attorney for Plaintiff
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57-1-24

KfcAL, 1LZ>1,\IL.
COLLATERAL REFERKNCES

C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages £ 555.
A.L.R. — Failure to keep up insurance as
jus!living foreclosure under ncceleraiion pmvi-

sion in mortgage or deed of trust, 69 A.L.R.3d
774.
Key N u m b e r s . — Mortgages *=» 341

57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of default.
The power of sale herein conferred upon the trustee shall not be exercised
until:
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of
each county wherein the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is
situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the
name of the trustor named therein and giving the hook and pa^e where
the same is recorded or a descnpt ion of t he i rust proper*;. . •.<; •. "nlamihL'
a statement that a breach of an obligation for which th»- tru>i property
was conveyed as security has occur) »••! and setting for'!; the nature of
such breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold such property t<>
satisfy the obligation;
(b> not less than three months shall hereafter elap.-r. :id
t o after the lapse of at least three months the trustee >ha 11 eive notice
of sale as provided in this act.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, * 6; 1967. ch.
131. * 1.
NOTES TO DECISr N T h r e e - m o n t h time p e r i o d .
Rule 601 of the Bankruptcy Act. which provide? that the filing of a bankruptcy petition
shall operate as a stay of any act to enforce a
lien against property in custody of the bank-

ruptcy court, does not su?pend the runn.r.2 of
the three-month time period required by this
section McCarthy v. Lewis. 615 P 2d 1256
(Utah 1980).

COLLATEKAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 557
Key N u m b e r s . — Mortgages &=> .'M*v

57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property
— Time and place of sale.
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale particularl^describing the property to be sold (a» by publication of such notice, at
least three times, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least 10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some
newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the propt-ny
tn be sold, or some part thereof, is situated, and <b> by posting surh noiuv. <:'.
least 20 days before the date of sab 1 , in some conspicuous phuv on UR- pr^pt.-r.;.'
to be sold and also in at least three public places of each city or county m
which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated
40-1

CONVEYANCES

57-1-31

the sale took place. Upon depositing such balance, the trustee shall be discharged from all further responsibility therefor and the county clerk shall
deposit the same with the county treasurer subject to the order of th~ district
court of said county.
History: L. 1961. oh. 181. $ 11.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
D u d e s of trustee.
A trustee under trust deed has an affirm ative duty to uphold his statutory responsihilities, and may not ignore those responsibilities

in orck-r to assist certain interest 1. : - r - at the
e x p e n d <>( others. Kandail v Vail-- T.'le. (SHI
\\2d 21 H (Utah 19M

COI.I.ATEKAl. RHFKKKNVKS
C.J.S.
fv.i i .] > M m t s j a ^ - s ."»'.'«;
Key N u m b e r s .
M'lrt^a^cs : - a7»'«

57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate
stock evidencing water rights given to secure
trust deed.
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water right.- used, intended ".
or suitable for use on the trust property and which are hypothecated
an obligation .secured by a trust deed may he sold with the trust p.ai";\ oart thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided lr.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 12.
Meaning of "this act'\ -— The phrase *"thi>
act" appearing at the end of this section appar-

' r used,
: -ecure
i r r t y , or
:r.> act.

ently refers to L. 1 % : . ch 1*1 <A;...- enacted
this section and ^> "-'-'J 1 * to r " • 1 -29 and
">7-l-31 to 57-1 -.'US.

57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obligations secured — Reinstatement— Cancellation of
recorded notice of default.
'< 1 > Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any </h!igat. ~. --.-cured
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligati ~ r^come
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the per:":r:nance
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in thr z v.rnent
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of la:. .;-T of the
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust u*-ed. tax- - >.ssessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the heneficiar;. .r. accordance with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the t r i > : : ; <>r his
successor in interest in the trust property or any part ih^reuf or - r. • other
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of r e c r d t h e t - - .r any
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within ih.--- •\<>nthof the filing for record of notice of default under such trust «ir»'d. if i: »ver ut
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or hi- -uccessor .:. :.teres*
the entire amount then due under the terms of such tru>t deec .r..aiding
costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such - ..nation.
409

or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred 1 other
than such portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default
occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all
proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued
and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain
in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred.
(2) If the default is cured and the trust uued reinstated in the manner
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand
of any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to
him a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the recorded notice of default under such trust deed; and any beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after
such demand, refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver such cancellation is liable to the person entitled to such request for all damages it suiting from such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or
beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustue's deed constitutes a cancellation of a notice of default Otherwise, a cancellation of a recordod not;.- .»('
default under a trust deed is. when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded mil
is sufficient if made and •executed by the trustee in subMantiallv the folb»v. :ng
form:
Can. illation of Notice of Default
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record
, 19
, and record in Book
, Page
, Record- of
County, (or filed of record
19
, with recorder's entry
No.
,
County). Utah, which notice of default refer- to the
trust deed executed bv
as trustor, in which
is named as
beneficiary and
_ as trustee, and filed for record
. 19
and recorded in Book
Page
, Records of
County, (or filed of record
19
, with recorder's entry No.
,
County), Utah.
(legal description*
Signature of Trustee
Historv: L. 1961, ch. 181, « 13; 1967, ch.
131, § 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985, ch. 68, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1981 amendment deleted "not exceeding in the aggregate
fifty dollars or one-half of one percent of the
entire unpaid principal sum secured, whichever is greater" after "fees actually incurred"
at the end of the parenthetical phrase in the
first sentence; inserted the third sentence; inserted "Otherwise" at the beginning of the
fourth sentence; inserted "(legal description*"
in the form; and made minor changes in phraseology, punctuation and style.

T!it* 1985 amendment de>U:nat*-d T:>.- :-irmerlv undesignated paragraphs a> Suo--.-::; n>
(1> and i2), deleted "or. otherwise at an;, time
prior to the entry of the decree of foreclosure"
and 'and the obligation secured th c r>-h. :>ar
the middle of Sub>ection i 1 .\ suh-uvr.'-i "in
the manner provided m Suh-'-i-tion 1 :" r in
the manner hereinabove provided n»-ar ':> beginning and deleted "be" near th«- t-nd ,:" "u\>section <2i. and made minor tiiiiii^t-. n. ;,.-..• .•.->•• •
olop\ and punctuation

410

57-3-1

REAL ESTATE

CHAPTER 3
RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS
Section
57-3-1.
57-3-2.

57-3-L

Section
57-3-3.
57-3-4.

Certificate of acknowledgment or of
proof of execution a prerequisite.
Record imparts notice — Recordation not affected by change in interest rate — Validity of document
not affected — Third person not
charged with notice of unnamed
interests — Conveyance free and
clear of unrecorded interests.

Effect of failure to record.
Certified copies entitled to record
another county — Effect.
57-3-10. Legal description of real proper
and names and addresses requir
in documents.
57-3-11. Original documents required — Ca
tions — Legibility.

Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of exi
cution a prerequisite.

A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the proof of tl
execution of any document that is signed and certified by the officer takir
the acknowledgment as provided in this title, entitles the document and tl
certificate to be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where tl
real property is located.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999;
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-1; 1988, ch. 155, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "doc
ment" for "conveyance" throughout the secti
and made stylistic changes.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Law Reviews. — Recent Developments in
Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123.

57-3-2, Record imparts notice — Recordation not affecte
by change in interest rate — Validity of doci
ment not affected — Third person not charge
with notice of unnamed interests — Conveyanc
free and clear of unrecorded interests.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manm
prescribed by this title; each original document or certified copy of a documei
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged; and each i
nancing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not a
knowledged; shall, from the time of filing with the appropriate county r
corder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the intere
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underl;
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of t\
document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect 1
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of th
document.
72

names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any
other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000;
C.L. 1917, $ 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159,
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1988, added Subsections
(3) to (5- and rewrote Subsections (1) and (2), as
last amended by Laws 1985, ch 159. § 7, to
such an extent that a detailed comparison is
impracticable.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of failure to record
Mortgages.
Recordation as notice.
—Time from which notice imparted.
Effect of failure to record.
Where a prior deed was not recorded until
three years after the purchasers' assignments
of their equitable interests in the property
were executed and recorded, the assignee had
no constructive notice of the deed, and the asBignee's hen was therefore superior to a bank's
subsequent trust deed received from the purchasers. Utah Farm Prod. Credit' Assoc, v.
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 19871.

this section Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v
Wasatch Bank, 734 P 2d 904 (Utah 1987*.
Recordation as notice,
__Time f r o m w h j c h n o d c e im
d>
T h e d . , ;f r e c o r d
n o l l h e d a t e of e x e c u .
t i o n g0V|; .. MS t h e U m e f r o m w h l c h a n i n s t r u .
m e n t i m p a r l s n o t ) c e l 0 a l i persons Uiah Farm
p r o d C r e d l t A s s n v Wasatch Bank. 734 P.2c
994 (Utah 1986)

Mortgages.
Mortgages are subject to the provisions of

57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against an;subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith anc
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's conveyance is first duly recorded
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001;
C.L. 1917, §4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943.
78-3-3; 1988, ch. 155, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988. substituted "docu-

73

ment" for "conveyance -,t" real esu'V in t.>
introductory paragraph added Sub,- uun> .
and <2\ deleting comparable pnn.-.,n.- \r-~
the lntroductorv paragraph, and rr.cje mir.. *
stylistic changes

II. EFFECT O F A L T E R A T I O N ; FACTORS CONSIDERED
A. I N GENERAL

§ 3. Generally; kinds of instruments.
The general rules as to the effect of Unauthorized alterations in written
instruments were originally applied only to deeds, and appear to have been
founded on the solemn character of sealed instruments as evidence. The
doctrine was later extended to bills of exchange, and was finally held to apply
indiscriminately to all written instruments conveying title to property or
evidencing legal rights or obligations. 18
§ 4. Materiality of alteration, generally.
It is now14 the settled general rule that an alteration of an instrument,
in order to have a vitiating effect, must be material; 16 or, stated conversely,
that an immaterial alteration of an instrument does not affect its validity.16
This general rule is recognized under both the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.17
§ 5 . — What constitutes material alteration. 18
Generally speaking, any alteration of an instrument is material which destroys the identity of the instrument or of the contract evidenced thereby, or
which so changes its terms as to give it a different legal effect from that which
13. Vanauken v Hornbcck, 14 NJL 182;
Newell v Mayberry, 30 Va (3 Leigh) 250.
The same rule as to alteration applies to
negotiable promissory notes as to other instruments. Wilson v Hayes, 40 Minn 531, 42
NW 467.
As to alteration of wills, see W I L L S (1st ed
;i§ 508 et seq,).
14. According to the early English doctrine,
any alteration of an instrument, however immaterial, if made by the payee or obligee
of such instrument, would avoid it. Lewis
v Payn, 8 Cow (NY) 7 1 ; Wricker v Jones,
159 NC 102, 74 SE 801. In some jurisdictions
in the United States in early cases it was
sought to hold rigidly to this doctrine. But
these cases either have been expressly or impliedly overruled, or have not been followed,
or have been superseded by statute. (As to
the present law, see the discussion following
in this and the next succeeding sections.)
15. Fordyce v Kosminski, 49 Ark 40, 3 SW
892: Harris v Jacksonville Bank, 22 Fla 5 0 1 ,
1 So 140; Vogle v Ripper, 34 111 100; Cypress
Creek Coal Co. v Boonville Min. Co. 194 Ind
187, 142 NE 645; Gushing v Field, 70 Me
50; Mitchell v Ringgold. 3 Harr & J ( M d )
159: White Sewing Mach. Co. v Dakin, 86
Mich 581, 49 NW 5 8 3 : Herrick v Baldwin,
17 Minn 209; Bridges v Winters. 42 Miss
135; Bank of Moberly v Meals, 316 Mo 1158,
295 SW 7 3 ; Gleason v Hamilton, 138 NY
353, 34 NE 283; Wicker v Jones, 159 NC
102. 74 SE 8 0 1 ; Newman v King, 54 Ohio
St 273, 43 NE 6 8 3 : Manufacturers' & M.
Bank v Follett, 11 RI 92; Sawyer v National
F. Ins. Co. 53 SD 228, 220 NW 503, 61
6

ALR 306; Bank of Tennessee v Funding
Board, 84 Tcnn (16 Lea) 46; Reed v Roark,
14 Tex 329; McClure v Little, 15 Utah 379,
49 P 298; Newell v Mayberry, 30 V a ( 3
Leigh) 250; James Employees Credit Union
v Hawley, 2 Wis 2d 490, 87 NW2d 299.
The early English doctrine was modified,
even in the time of Lord Coke, to the extent that the alteration must be material, and
that the question as to the time when made
should be submitted to a jury. In 2 Co Litt
225b, it is said that "of ancient time, if the
deed appeared to be rased or interlined in
places material, the judges adjudged upon
their view the deed to be void; but of latter
time the judges have left that to the jurors
to try whether the rasing or interlining were
before the delivery." Wicker v Jones, 159
NC 102,74 SE 801.
Practice
Aids.—Instructions
to jury as to
materiality of alteration and as to effect of
material alteration.
1 AM J U R P L & PR
FORMS

1:1008-1:1010.

16. Van Horn v Bell, 11 Iowa 465: Bridges
v Winters, 42 Miss 135; Reed v Roark, 14
Tex 329.
If a negotiable instrument is altered in some
immaterial particular, the liability of the parties on the instrument is not affected. Palmer
v Largent, 5 Neb 223.
17. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act
§§ 124, 125; Uniform Commercial C de § 3 407.
18. As to negotiable instruments generally,
see § 6, infra.

-v *> tuc u i t t i ui me iici upon me instrument,
I
and not the particular manner in which it is done, that is material, whether
by interlineation, addition, substitution, change of words, detaching material
memoranda therefrom, erasure, or by cancellation of some material provision
thereof.*0 That is material which might become material, and any alteration
which may in any event alter the rights, duties, or obligations of the person
sought to be charged, is material in the legal sense.1 An alteration which enlarges the scope of an instrument as evidence is material.1 An unauthorized
change of or addition to an instrument which has the effect of extending
the period of limitation of actions is a material alteration.3 On the other hand,
•an alteration of an instrument may be considered immaterial if it does not
vary the menning of such instrument in any essential particular,4 and if the
rights or interests, duties or obligations of either of the parties arc in no manner
changed,5 or if what is written or erased has no tendency to produce a change
19. Moore v First Nat. Bank, 211 Ala 367,
100 So 349. 34 ALR 526; Woods v Spann.
190 Ark 1085. 82 SW2d 850; Coleman v
Dawson, 11U Cal App 201, 294 P 13; Ruwaldt v W C McBride, Inc. 388 111 285, 57
NE2d 863. ]".") ALR 1209; Coburn v Webb,
56 Ind 96. Builders Lime & Cement Co. v
Weiiner. 170 Iowa 444, 151 NW 100; Palmer
v Blanrhard, 1 H Me 380, 94 A 220; Martin
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